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1. Introduction
Before the introduction of cloud computing, or-
ganizations used to host their own computing re-
sources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applica-
tions, and services). By moving to clouds, com-
panies can achieve advantages like cost reduc-
tion (both building and management cost), get-
ting elastic infrastructure and broad network ac-
cess but they also face new problems in terms of
security and lack of open standards.
A study [1] in 2014 shows that 60% of small
and medium businesses were already using cloud
services. However, in the same study lack of trust
in service providers and security concerns were
shown to be major barriers for nearly 40% of the
companies. Hence it becomes clear that address-
ing trust and security issues will benefit not only
the users but also expand revenue of the provider
by attracting new customers.
We focus our work on security monitoring
in clouds. Cloud security refers to mechanisms,
technologies and controls deployed to protect
data, applications and the associated infrastruc-
ture of cloud computing. Security mechanisms
aim to achieve security principles including Con-
fidentiality, Integrity and Availability. Security
Monitoring is the collection, analysis, and esca-
lation of indications and warnings to detect and
respond to intrusions.
One of the risks of moving to a public cloud
is losing full control of the information system
infrastructure. The service provider will be in
charge of monitoring the actual infrastructure
and provide the required service to clients. In our
work, we aim to allow providers to provide cus-
tomers with guarantees on security monitoring of
their outsourced information system.
1.1 SLA and Security Monitoring in Cloud
When customers need to get service from cloud
providers they sign an agreement called Service
Level Agreement (SLA). In general SLAs de-
scribe the provided service, the rights and obliga-
tions of both parties and state penalties for when
the specified terms are not respected. Hence, an
SLA helps providers to build more trust.
For example Amazon cloud service (EC2 and
EBS) offers SLA terms of availability of more
than 99.95% and 10% service credit in return if
not respected. Also, 30% in return if the avail-
ability is less than 99.0%. However, usually SLA
terms are not related to security monitoring. This
raises trust issues for companies outsourcing their
information system in the cloud.
Since you can never get ahead of the threat,
monitoring cloud infrastructure’s behavior is im-
portant. By monitoring a system it is possible to
detect suspicious behaviors and take action before
severe damage. Devices like Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) and logs from firewalls are often
used for this purpose.
To include security monitoring terms into an
SLA at least the following tasks are required.
First, a way for providers/clients to specify their
security monitoring parameters/requirements, sec-
ond mechanisms to enforce these requirements
in a cloud infrastructure and finally a verification
method to check if the requirements are respected
at any given time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes some related works on cloud
IDSs, IDS evaluation, SLA and languages used
to define SLAs. In Section 3 we discuss the
challenges on inclusion of monitoring terms into
SLAs. Section 4 presents the proposed methodol-
ogy and we will finish by conclusion and future
work on Section 5.
2. Related works
There exists some works on both creating secu-
rity monitoring devices for a cloud [11] and defin-
ing languages and frameworks for SLA descrip-
tion [7]. The domain specific language proposed
in [11] describes the detection algorithms of the
IDS rather than Service-Level Objectives (SLO,
for example a set of rules) that can be negotiated
before figuring in an SLA. In other words, the lan-
guage is too low-level to describe SLOs.
In the field of security SLA definition Karin
Bernsmed et al. [3] discussed what terms could be
included in relation to security without describing
how to include them. In [4, 6] Cascella, Jegou et
al. describe a method to deploy applications in
a federated cloud under a restriction of a given
SLA. But the SLA definition is restricted to lo-
calization of data storage.
To our knowledge, there have been no attempts
to include security monitoring terms in SLA. The
difficulty is that SLA terms related to security
monitoring devices need to be measurable and
verifiable in the cloud setup.
Regarding IDS evaluation metrics, Stefan Ax-
elsson [2] and Gu et al [5] presented a theoret-
ical approach to measure IDSs and showed that
metrics that don’t include base rates (defined as
the ratio between the number of attack network
packets and the total number of network packets)
do not truly describe the ability of an IDS to be
practically usable. This problem is known as the
Base-Rate Fallacy [2]. The latter one proposed a
single unified metrics called Intrusion Detection
Capability (CID).
In the field of security monitoring there have
been different studies to develop evaluation mech-
anisms for existing monitoring devices and adapt
them to the cloud environment. In [9, 10] Probst
et al. describe IDS evaluation method in two
phases: analysis of network access control phases
and the IDS evaluation phase based on the set of
services running in the virtual infrastructure.
In [8] Massicotte et al. also proposed an eval-
uation method. They used virtual infrastructure
to generate traffic traces and they used the traces
to evaluate IDSs in traditional servers (non-cloud
environment). Both approaches measure the effi-
ciency of an IDS, the former in a given virtualized
infrastructure and the latter as a generic product,
but neither of them take the base rate into ac-
count.
3. Challenges
We are searching for a way to allow cloud
providers to offer SLA terms related to security
monitoring. From the technical aspect, there are
a number of challenges to include security moni-
toring terms in SLAs, which include:
1. The malleability of virtualized infrastructures:
By its nature the cloud is very dynamic. Cre-
ation, deletion and migration of VMs is fre-
quent. Security monitoring terms must antici-
pate such changes.
2. Difficulty of expressing security monitoring
properties using precise terms. Lack of stan-
dards to express such terms makes the process
difficult. Also, expressing monitoring terms at
an abstract policy level is difficult since it will
be enforced at a lower level.
3. Policy enforcement is done at the lower level:
The actual monitoring happens at the packet
level. At this stage, context and semantic knowl-
edge are unknown. Also, packets could be lost
which creates data loss making the monitoring
difficult.
4. There is a lack of method to evaluate security
monitoring setups, specifically in clouds.
Taking IDSs as an example, to include terms
related to IDSs, we need to have a way to state
IDS rules to apply in SLAs, mechanisms to en-
force terms in a given infrastructure and a way to
verify if the terms are respected at a given time.
All these methods should be independent from
the specific IDS implementation.
4. Proposed Approach
As a design requirement, making the security
monitoring process - definition, enforcement and
verification of SLA terms - automatic is essential,
because manual management of security proper-
ties in a cloud is tedious and error prone.
First, we found measurable parameters for a
given monitoring device, e.g. an IDS, and verifi-
cation mechanisms for these parameters. For an
IDS, Intrusion Detection Capability is a single
unified metric, which aggregates a base rate in its
formula in addition to other traditionally used pa-
rameters like detection and precision rate. Since
the exact value of the base rate is unknown we
used a range of statistically proposed values.
4.1 Intrusion Detection Capability (CID)
CID is a metric used to evaluate IDSs, which was
introduced by Gu et al [5]. Let ‘x’ be the random
variable representing the IDS input where it can
be either part of an attack or a legitimate packet
and ‘y’ representing the IDS output where it can
be detected as an intrusive or non-intrusive packet
by the IDS.
• The entropy (a measure of uncertainty of in-
formation content) H(x) of a discrete random
variable ‘x’ is defined as follows, the higher
value indicating the more uncertain.
H(x) = -
∑
x p(x) log p(x)
Note that:
base rate (B) = p(x=‘is an attack packet’)
• The mutual information I(x;y) which measures
the amount of information shared between the
two random variables is defined as:
I(x; y) =
∑
x
∑
y p(x,y) log
p(x,y)
p(x)p(y)
• The Intrusion Detection Capability (CID) can
be defined as:
CID =
I(x;y)
H(x)
Its value ranges in [0,1] and a higher value in-
dicates a better IDS ability in accurately classify-
ing the input packets.
4.2 Verification Mechanism
The verification mechanism runs attacks against
a given configuration but without damaging the
production environment. An example of the at-
tack running environment is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Attack Running Mechanism
In a given infrastructure we add a target VM
(shown in a green box) after an IDS to be veri-
fied. This VM exhibits the behavior of other VMs
under that IDS. Multiple target VMs could also
be added in a case where a single VM is unable
to exhibit all the required behaviors. An attacker
machine is also added. This machine could be
located inside or outside the cloud. The attacker
runs a set of representative attacks and the vir-
tual switch is configured to redirect all the attack
packets towards the target VMs. Since the attack
running mechanism uses the production infras-
tructure network resources, we must take care that
the attacks have a reasonably low impact on those
resources.
The rate of the occurrence of attack packets is
determined by a given base rate. In this process
all the out going packets from the attacker and the
output of the IDS are logged. Using information
from the attack packets we can differentiate true
positives from false positives in the output of IDS.
Using these values and the injected base rate we
calculate the CID.
The verification could be done either by the
provider or by the client. But clients should trust
providers, in the case where the provider perform
the verification.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
In conclusion there is a need to include security
monitoring into SLAs. In our work we chose the
CID as a usable metric to describe the efficiency
of an IDS, because it takes the base rate into ac-
count. We also presented an evaluation mecha-
nism to measure CID of an IDS dynamically using
attack injection. This method is used as SLA ver-
ification mechanism.
The attack packets are redirected, as a result it
will not damage the production VMs. But there is
a trade-off between the evaluation methodology
and performance of production infrastructure. A
care should be taken since the evaluation pro-
cess uses production network infrastructure (not
a cloned or simulated one). In particular it needs
caution for not creating unacceptable traffic load.
The trade-off could also be specified in the agree-
ment (SLA).
In this work we described SLA terms related to
the efficiency of an IDS. Other aspects of the IDS
could also be expressed in SLA terms, which we
are planning as future work. Also, in this work
we focused on IDSs, which are one of the most
used monitoring devices. In the future we plan to
describe other monitoring devices in SLA terms.
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